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Abstract
Complementary to rich existing evidence on bank competition and corporate innovation, 
this paper aims to investigate the impacts of bank competition on innovation efficiencies, 
in terms of both R&D input and output at firm level. By acknowledging the role played by 
information asymmetries in financing innovation, we also examine the moderating effects 
of information specialization at both industry and firm level on corporate innovation. Ana-
lyzing innovation and bank structure data from U.S. between 1992 and 2010, we show 
novel evidence that increased bank competition improves innovation efficiencies in terms 
of both R&D input (investment) and output (patents and profits generated by R&D). In 
addition, we find bank competition has a greater favorable effect on innovation for those 
firms with more specialized information, such as those operating in an industry with more 
dispersed productivity growth and those with more concentrated patent types. Overall, our 
findings support market power hypothesis and banking strategic theory where bank compe-
tition improves credit supply to corporate innovation.
Keywords Bank market · Competition · Corporate innovation · Efficiencies · Information 
specialization
JEL Classification G20 · L10 · O30
1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies have identified the favorable effects of improved competition in 
banking markets on corporate innovation (e.g. Amore et al. 2013) because of the increased 
credit supply and lowered costs of finance (Rice and Strahan 2010). Prior studies have also 
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attempted to examine the moderating roles played by firm level characteristics in a ‘bank 
competition – corporate innovation’ relationship, such as firm age (e.g. Chava et al. 2013), 
nature of business in terms of public listing (e.g. Cornaggia et al. 2015), dependence on 
external finance (e.g. Amore et al. 2013) and financial constraints (e.g. Guariglia and Liu 
2014). What is little known is about the role played by information specialization when 
financing corporate innovation activities. This is particularly important because corporate 
innovation carries a nature of being informationally opaque (Hall et  al. 2005; Lobo and 
Xie 2018) and such a feature may moderate or mediate the favorable effects of bank com-
petition on corporate innovation and the role played by banks in alleviating asymmetric 
information problems (Hadlock and James 2002). Moreover, bank market deregulation on 
interstate banking and branching has enabled banks to better diversify risk geographically 
(Amore et al. 2013). Banks still face a trade-off between funding more diversified innova-
tion activities for risk diversification purpose and financing more specialized innovation for 
cost efficiency reasons in acquiring information from innovative borrowers.
This paper aims to advance our understanding around the bank market effects on cor-
porate innovation. We commence our baseline analysis by revisiting the favorable effects 
of bank competition on corporate innovation to test the validity of our key bank competi-
tion measure, H-statistic, and our empirical model specification. Our results show robust 
evidence on the favorable and economically sizable effects of bank competition on corpo-
rate innovation where an increase of H-statistic by 0.1 raises patent and citation counts by 
16% and 53% respectively. This paper differs from prior literature in three aspects. Firstly, 
we use unique ‘information’ measures at both industry (productivity growth dispersion) 
and firm (patent type distribution) level to capture information specialization and asym-
metries of innovative firms. We show novel evidence that banking competition has stronger 
favorable effects on more concentrated patenting activities which are characterized by a 
higher degree of specialized proprietary information. For example, the marginal effects of 
improved banking competition are 16% greater for those firms with more concentrated pat-
ents than for those with dispersed patents. This result reveals that, in the presence of infor-
mation asymmetries when financing corporate innovation, banks benefit from the econo-
mies of scale in acquiring more specialized information.
This paper also differs from prior literature by offering additional evidence on the 
favorable effects of bank competition on innovation efficiencies. Recent empirical studies 
(e.g. Amore et al. 2013) have mainly focused on such effects on the quantity (e.g. num-
ber of patents) and quality (e.g. citation, originality) of corporate innovation. This paper, 
instead, focuses on the efficiencies of corporate innovation and shows that bank competi-
tion improves innovation efficiencies, in terms of the numbers of patents per million dollar 
R&D investment and the profits generated by R&D spending, which have been neglected 
by recent empirical studies. Our results suggest that bank competition does not only 
increase credit supply but also improves the efficiencies of resource allocation where bank 
finance could be channeled to the most productive innovation activities.
Finally, when investigating banking competition effects, existing research has predomi-
nantly used exogenous banking market deregulation (e.g. Chava et al. 2013; Amore et al. 
2013) and market development (e.g. Benfratello et al. 2008; Hsu et al. 2014) as a measure 
of market structure. In this paper, we show evidence on the existence of endogeneity of 
banking market structure and use a variety of measures, including Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
(Panzar and Rosse 1984), RS Index (Rice and Strahan 2010), branch density and Herfin-
dahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) in the analysis. The endogenous issue exists because, first, 
unobserved state (local) characteristics could jointly determine banking market competi-
tion and corporate innovation activities (Butler and Cornaggia 2011). Second, there could 
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be a causal issue where bank finances support corporate innovation while innovation 
could also lead bank finance to follow (Audretsch et al. 2012). To address this concern, we 
employ an instrumental variable approach and use ‘state median1 Tier 1 capital ratio’ as an 
instrument for banking market competition. The underlying validation of our instrument 
lies in that the incumbent banks with higher Tier 1 capital ratio would have better ability 
to accumulate capital to build a buffer against failure and to set up a higher entry barriers 
for new players on the equilibrium path and thus, market concentration occurs (Corbae and 
D’Erasmo 2014).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on 
the effects of bank market competition on credit availability and corporate innovation. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Sec-
tion 5 concludes and summarizes the paper.
2  Related literature
Corporate innovation has been an important research topic for decades and recent empiri-
cal studies have provided additional empirical evidence on the importance of R&D and 
innovation. For example, innovation enhances the performance and survival of firms by 
offering new growth opportunities (Artz et  al. 2010). However, due to the inflexibility 
of R&D investment, R&D may also increase corporate distress risk especially for those 
financially constrained firms and during the economic downturns (Zhang 2015). In financ-
ing corporate innovation activities, venture capital investors have exhibited location bias 
(Cumming and Dai 2010) and focused more on the commercialization of existing innova-
tions and the growth of the invested innovative firms (Engel and Keilbach 2007). Moreo-
ver, their exit strategies rely on the success of innovation activities (e.g. number of patents) 
of the firms they invested (Wang and Wang 2012).
As one of the most important external finance suppliers to firms, banks play an impor-
tant role in credit supply, determining cost of finance and bank-firm relationship (e.g. Gian-
netti 2012) with corporate innovation. There has been ample theoretical and empirical evi-
dence on the roles played by banks and banking market structure in financing innovative 
firms but empirical evidence is never conclusive. Literature built on the traditional market 
power hypothesis (e.g. Ongena and Smith 2001; Jayaratne and Strahan 1996) suggests that 
a decrease in competition restricts the supply of credit and, thereby, decreases innovation. 
This is because the monopoly power in banking sector would drive interest rates high and 
credit supply low, resulting in a loss of overall market efficiencies (Stein 2002; Beck et al. 
2004). Competition, instead, improves the availability of external finance and lowers the 
costs of finance for businesses (Lian 2018; Mi and Han 2018).
In contrast, according to the information-based hypothesis, market power enables banks 
to extract informational rent (e.g. Stiglitz 2002) and banks would have stronger incentives 
to acquire private information in a concentrated banking market because of their ability 
to subsidize credit-constrained firms at the beginning of the relationship and to extract 
the rent later (Sharpe 1990; Petersen and Rajan 1995). Such relationships, however, are 
not sustainable in a competitive market because of the free-riding problem (Dell’Ariccia 
1 Instead of regulatory minimum ratio, we use a median ratio as instrument to reflect a performed capital 
ratio with a market equilibrium. This is also because banks may be still undercapitalized even their capital 
ratio is above the minimum.
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and Marquez 2004) and increased capital market competition reduces relationship lending 
(Fraser et  al. 2012). Therefore, credit supply to those informationally opaque and finan-
cially constrained firms could be greater in a concentrated banking market. For example, 
Han et al. (2009) have shown that small firms are less likely to be financially constrained 
in terms of being discouraged from borrowing in a more concentrated banking market than 
in a competitive market. Additional evidence is available from Petersen and Rajan (1995), 
Black and Strahan (2002), and Cetorelli (2004). Indeed, banks have to face problems of 
asymmetric information when financing informationally opaque businesses. Instead of 
the traditional arguments on relationship lending, banking strategic theory proposes that 
greater competition in local credit markets would improve bank cost efficiency (Chortareas 
et al. 2016) and drive banks to increase credit supply to small, proximate and opaque bor-
rowers (McKee and Kagan 2018). As a result, banks would create a competitive edge that 
helps insulate themselves from pure price competition from outside banks (Boot and Tha-
kor 2000; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004).
This paper is motivated by recent research development in bank competition and cor-
porate innovation (e.g. Cornaggia et al. 2015) which has shown consistent evidence on the 
favorable effects of bank competition and financial development on corporate innovation 
in Italy (Benfratello et  al. 2008), U.S. (Cornaggia et  al. 2015), China (Hsu et  al. 2013) 
and cross country (Hsu et al. 2014). The favorable effects come from the increased credit 
supply (Amore et al. 2013) and reduced cost of finance for businesses (Rice and Strahan 
2010) when bank market becomes more competitive and the improved capability of banks 
to diversify risk after bank deregulation (Amore et al. 2013). The favorable effects are also 
driven by the improved pricing mechanism of equity markets (Hsu et  al. 2014) and the 
nurturing role of financial systems on innovation (Hsu et al. 2013) in both developed and 
emerging economies.
The widely accepted favorable effects of bank competition and financial development 
on corporate innovation have been found to vary over firm level characteristics and the 
nature of innovation, such as firm age (Acs and Audretsch 1988), dependence on exter-
nal finance (Cohen and Klepper 1996), financial constraints (Amore et al. 2013), private 
vs. public firms (Chava et al. 2013), and process vs. product innovation (Boer and During 
2001). Overall, it has been shown that firms with a greater dependence on bank credit for 
innovation, such as those young, small and private firms would benefit more from bank 
market competition and financial development (e.g. Petersen and Rajan 2002; Rajan and 
Zingales 1998; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006). However, what is less known about the ‘bank 
competition—corporate innovation’ relationship is how information moderates the effects 
of bank competition on innovation and the economic consequences of bank competition 
to innovation efficiencies. In light of the innovation literature, knowledge-intensive firms 
have intrinsically higher information and knowledge gap with firm outsiders (Jia 2019). 
The higher information specialization poses a problem for the innovative firms to terminate 
or initiate a lending relationship with banks, so that information differentiation captures 
the degree of specialization in relationship building (Boot and Thakor 2000). Because of 
the high level of switching costs, firms with intensive proprietary information would not 
switch banks easily even if the rival banks tend to reduce loan pricing when competition is 
introduced. In this scene, banks are able to extract information rents in the range of switch-
ing costs and the higher the degree of specialization of the information, the steadier the 
rent of such information will be. Therefore, it expected that the greater competition among 
banks frequently facilitates more for the financing of those informationally opaque firms 
through producing the high degree of proprietary information which avoids the adverse 
effect of ongoing competition on profits.
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Overall, the two under-studied areas are important to deepen our understanding on the 
roles of bank competition and financial development in facilitating corporate innovation 
because corporate innovation activities are risky and informationally opaque (Hall et  al. 
2005) and further empirical studies are called to investigate if increased credit supply has 
been channeled to the most productive innovation activities. To fill in these research gaps, 
this paper is aimed to examine the moderating effects of information opaqueness and the 
effects of bank competition on innovation efficiencies.
3  Data and methodology
3.1  Data
Our data are collected from various sources. To measure corporate innovation, we col-
lect data from National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER) patent database and Hall 
et al. (2001) and Li et al. (2014) with detailed information on the patents granted by United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1976 to 2010. We exclude sample pat-
ents granted to universities, governments and foreign companies who rely weakly on local 
banking markets. We collect local (state level) bank information from Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and firm level data from COMPUSTAT. In addition, we also 
collect state level venture capital investment information from National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA) as a proxy for alternative sources of finance for innovation and state 
level controls from Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louis. Our analysis is based on 44,567 
firm-year observations between 1992 and 20102 which allow us to use both innovation data 
and bank data and to consider the effects of banking market deregulation in U.S. (Amore 
et al. 2013).
3.2  Measuring corporate innovation and innovation efficiencies
We measure corporate innovation by a widely used patent-metrics (Nelson et  al. 2014) 
which prevents the problems arising from accounting practices, such as R&D expendi-
ture (Dugan et  al. 2016), and represents the output or the commercialization of innova-
tion activities (Ciftci and Zhou 2016). Corporate innovative outputs are captured by the 
‘weight-adjusted’ numbers (see detail from Hall et  al. 2001) of patents ( Patentijt ) filed 
by company i in state j in year t and citations ( Citationijt) as a measure of the economic 
importance of innovation activities. We measure innovation efficiency by (1) the number of 
patents generated by per million dollar R&D investment ( Patent∕R&D ) and (2) return on 
R&D ( Profit∕R&D ). We also examine the bank competition effects on R&D expenditure 
as a measure of innovation inputs.
2 More recent data on bank market structure are available from FDIC and we find bank market has become 
less competitive (measured by Panzar-Rosse H Statistics) since financial crisis. Upon availability of more 
recent data on patents, future research could look into how financial crisis and reduced bank competition 
affect corporate innovation. We appreciate an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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3.3  Measuring banking market competition and controlling for endogeneity
To measure banking market competition, we use Panzar-Rosse H-statistic3 (H henceforth) 
(Panzar and Rosse 1984) with long term equilibrium in the main tests and RSIndex, HHI 
and Branch Density in the robustness tests. H has been acknowledged to be robust and 
superior to other competition measures, being derived from profit-maximizing equilib-
rium conditions (Shaffer 2004; Claessens and Laeven 2004) and widely used to test bank-
ing market competition (e.g. Molyneux et al. 1994; Bikker and Haaf 2002), with a range 
between 0 (monopolistic markets) and 1 (competitive markets).
A potential endogeneity issue of banking market competition may arise if the level 
of competition in a local banking market and corporate innovation decisions are jointly 
determined by unobserved state characteristics. We employ an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach by using ‘state median Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio’ as an instrument,4 relying on 
the fundamental feature of competitive markets with ‘free entry’ for new players and ‘free 
exit’ for those that fail (Tian and Han 2019). Tier 1 ratio measures how well a bank is capi-
talized in terms of the amount of core capital that it holds in comparison to the size and risk 
profile of the bank. In U.S., current capital requirement is based on Basel III accord and a 
bank is defined as being undercapitalized if its Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio is less than 6%. 
This rule was enforced jointly by Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and FDIC. Existing literature has shown a strong 
impact of bank capital on the stability of banks where banks with a high capital ratio have a 
greater ability to accumulate capital to build a buffer against unexpected losses. For example, 
a 50% increase in capital requirement in U.S. banking industry would reduce the exit rates of 
small banks by 45% and lead to a more concentrated industry (Corbae and D’Erasmo 2014). 
In addition, the capital regulation directly places a constraint on banks’ potential to entry in a 
local market. Therefore, a state with lower Tier 1 capital ratio would have a more competitive 
banking market (greater H). Our statistical evidence shows that the correlation between Tier 
1 ratio and H is—0.1718 (p < 0.01). Moreover, we have no reason to believe that performed 
capital ratio of banks directly affects corporate innovation activities.5
3.4  Industry information asymmetries and innovation information specialization
We measure the degree of information asymmetries at both industry and firm levels. At indus-
try level, we follow Duchin et al. (2010) and measure information asymmetries by productiv-
ity growth dispersion which is defined as the standard deviation of productivity (the ratio of 
sales to number of employees) growth rate based on a 3-digit SIC industry classification. Inno-
vative firms in a specific industry with a greater productivity growth dispersion are deemed to 
be more informationally opaque because their corporate performance carries a greater degree 
of idiosyncratic risk.
Because of the information-sensitivity nature of innovation activities (Jia 2019), a greater 
information specialization would create a problem for the innovative firms to terminate an 
4 Our empirical results are still robust when an alternative instrument (bank tangible capital ratio) is used. 
Results are available from the authors on request.
5 We empirically test the validity of the instrument by examining (1) if the performed Tier 1 ratio has any 
impacts on corporate innovation trends and (2) if the implementation of Basal Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision in 1997, on which Tier 1 ratio is based, has altered corporate innovation. Our results, 
not reported but available on request, show little evidence on such relationships and therefore validate the 
instrument we use. We appreciate an anonymous referee for raising this point.
3 The derivation of H is available from the authors on request.
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existing or initiate a new borrowing relationship with banks. The dynamic nature of innova-
tion, in both the evolutionary and resource-based perspectives, implies that firms with unique 
innovative capabilities would innovate in particular areas of the technological frontier more 
efficiently than others (Dosi 1982). This would lead to an increase of information rents over 
time. Therefore, more concentrated patenting activities are characterized by a higher degree of 
proprietary information specialization. At firm level, we follow Hall et al. (2001) and catego-
rize patents into six types, including chemical (excluding drugs), computers and communica-
tions, drugs and medical, electrical and electronics, mechanical and other. We then measure 
information specialization by the kurtosis and variance of distribution of patent types at firm 
level, which can better reflect the probability of extreme outliers produced by the distribution. 
We define a sample firm having dispersed patents (Dispersed patent =1) if its distribution of 
patent types has a kurtosis (variance) lower than 3 (greater than cross-industry median); con-
centrated patents (Dispersed patent =0) otherwise, where kurtosis is greater than 3.
3.5  Additional control variables
We also control for firm, industry and state characteristics that may affect corporate innovation 
outputs in our analysis, such as firm size and age, profitability (ROA), cash holding, growth 
opportunity (sales and Tobin’s Q), asset tangibility, leverage, capital to labor ratio, industry con-
centration, state-level coincident index and venture capital ratio. We winsorize these variables 
at  1st/99th percentile in the following analysis and variable definitions are provided in Appendix.
3.6  Summary statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Our 
main samples are 32,910 firm-year observations between 1992 and 2010. Averagely, each sam-
ple firm obtains 11 patents which receive 137 citations per year. In terms of innovation efficien-
cies, a typical firm invests US$79 m in R&D and every one dollar R&D investment generates 
US$0.65 profits. Averagely, every million dollar R&D investment would generate 0.8 patent.
Overall, the local (state) banking market is monopolistic competitive, measured by either 
H, RSIndex, HHI or Branch Density. A typical sample firm is 15 years old and has book value 
assets of US$5.188 billion, ROA of—%, cash-to-assets ratio (cash holding) of 22.7%, Tobin’s Q 
of 2.519, net property, plants and equipment (PPE)-to-assets ratio (tangibility) of 24.1%, leverage 
of 1.1%, capital to labor ratio of 4.32, and industry HHI of 0.014. On average, the kurtosis of pat-
ent type distribution is 3.8, indicating more concentrated patents generated by the sample firms.
3.7  Baseline specifications
Our basic econometric model6 (Eq. 1) focuses on the effects of banking market competition 
measured by Panzar-Rosse H-statistic ( Hjt ) on corporate innovation:
6 Our estimations are established by conjecturing that prevailing lending conditions over state areas where 
firms headquarter would place the most significant effects on corporate financing for innovation (e.g. Chava 
et al. 2013; Cornaggia et al. 2015). To ascertain if there are any domestic effects of the foreign activities of mul-
tinationals, in additional robustness tests, we particularly focus on the R&D spending performed by U.S. par-
ent companies which have foreign affiliates and also separate sample firms into ‘Domestic’ and ‘Multinational’ 
according to COMPUSTAT data sources. We find that our reported empirical evidence is virtually unaffected 
but those multinational firms would be less sensitive to the state banking market conditions. Results are not 
reported but available on request from the authors. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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where i, t, j and k denote company, year, state and industry respectively. Innovationijt is the 
measure of the level ( Patent , Citation ) and efficiency ( Patent∕R&D , Profit∕R&D ) of inno-
vation activities at firm level. Ĥjt is the predicted value of H after controlling for endogene-
ity by using ‘state median Tier 1 capital ratio’ as an instrument in the first stage and there-
fore, 훽
2
 is expected to capture the unbiased effect of H on innovative outcomes.Zit denotes a 
vector of firm-level controls. Given that the U.S. patenting activity increased substantially 
from mid-1980s (Hall 2004), we also control for the aggregate trends by Industryk and 
Yeart to capture industry and year fixed effects respectively, so that the estimated effect of 
banking competition on innovation is not driven by an industry- or time-specific trend.
(1)ln(Innovation)ijt = 훼2 + 훽2Ĥjt + 훾2n
∑
Zit + Industryk + Yeart + 휀2it
Table 1  Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the key variables in the empirical analysis. Detailed variables definitions are shown 
in Appendix
Variables Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Innovation variables
Number of patents (Patent)it 44,567 17 136 0 6460
Number of citations (Citation)it 44,567 99 1123 0 71,827
R&D ($m) (R&D)it+1 42,706 102.849 455.128 0.000 4297.000
Profits/R&D (Pr ofit∕R&D)it 44,567 10.644 28.152 − 3.432 237.920
Patents/R&D in $m (Patent∕R&D)it 44,567 36.413 191.699 − 3.432 14,263.881
Kurtosis of patent types distribution 21,002 3.935 2.930 − 3.333 6.000
Variance of patent types distribution 35,158 47.491 217.813 0.000 1363.5
Banking market competition variables
H-statistic ( Hjt) 41,016 0.568 0.241 0.104 1.000
RSIndex ( RSIndexjt) 27,982 2.603 1.381 0 4
HHI ( HHIjt) 36,992 0.012 0.026 0.001 0.465
Branch density ( Densityjt) 36,992 0.033 0.065 0.001 1.390
Other control variables
Size ($m) 42,784 4223.405 15,046.143 0.428 132,000.000
Age 44,567 14.538 9.015 1.000 35.000
Return on assets (ROA) 43,916 − 0.052 0.492 − 3.155 0.391
Cash holding 43,617 0.161 0.188 0.000 0.880
Asset tangibility 43,921 0.228 0.189 0.000 0.824
Capital to labor ratio 43,688 172.673 368.204 5.800 3126.051
Bank loan ratio 44,547 0.469 0.458 0.000 1.000
Leverage 43,926 0.106 0.464 − 1.685 2.766
Sales ($m) 43,925 2861.428 8869.681 0.000 72,102.047
Tobin’s Q 40,066 2.159 3.188 0.061 21.884
Product market HHI 44,567 0.094 0.172 0.003 1.000
Industry standard deviation of produc-
tivity growth
42,880 171.065 133.540 0.000 1393.517
Coincident Index 41,189 82.264 12.035 57.343 108.243
Venture capital 43,993 2972.408 6398.523 0.415 42,868.500
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4  Empirical results
4.1  Banking market competition and corporate innovation: a revisit
We commence our analysis by revisiting the favorable effects of bank competition on cor-
porate innovation which have been documented by recent empirical studies (e.g. Amore 
et al. 2013). We run a rich set of models with a variety of bank competition measures (e.g. 
HHI, Branch Density, H), model specifications (e.g. OLS, 2SLS, Poisson) and sampling 
approaches (e.g. after 1997 when IBBEA was fully implemented in U.S). Table 2 shows 
consistent and robust evidence that bank competition improves corporate innovation, in 
terms of quantity (Patents) and quality (Citations). Our results also confirm the validity 
of H, as a measure of bank competition with long term equilibrium. The favorable effects 
of bank competition on corporate innovation are economically sizeable. For example, an 
increase of H (mean = 0.594, δ = 0.239) by 0.1 would increase patent counts by 19% and 
citations by 47% (Models 3 and 4). Compared with the average number of patents (cita-
tions) produced by a company, this is equivalent to 2 additional patents and 64 more cita-
tions generated averagely for each sample firm per year, with an improved bank competi-
tion of H by 0.1.
4.2  Banking market competition and industrial information asymmetries
Due to the riskiness and informationally opaque nature of corporate innovation, it is antici-
pated that informationally opaque firms may benefit more from the improved bank com-
petition by having a better access to credit which they would not access in a more concen-
trated bank market. Whereas, it is also likely that informationally more transparent firms 
would enjoy more benefits from increased bank competition where in a competitive bank 
market, banks rely more heavily on hard information (e.g. firm size, accounting informa-
tion, tangibility) and have weaker motives to collect private information from information-
ally more opaque borrowers (Han et al. 2009).
To test these two competing possibilities, we divide samples into informationally 
opaque and transparent groups where the former (latter) has a higher (lower) industry 
productivity growth dispersion than cross-industry median in year t (Duchin et al. 2010). 
Table 3 shows that improved banking market competition increases innovation outputs for 
both informationally opaque and transparent businesses but the favorable effects are much 
stronger in the ‘opaque’ group. The difference is statistically significant at 1% level and 
economically large. For example, with an increase of bank competition H by 0.1, informa-
tionally opaque firms would increase their patent counts by 28%, compared with 11% for 
informationally transparent samples. The citation counts also increased by 76% and 37% 
for informationally opaque and transparent firms, respectively. This finding7 is compatible 
with the view that informationally opaque firms would benefit more from increased credit 
supply due to the improved bank competition and their innovation activities would be less 
financially constrained in a more competitive bank market.
7 This result is also robust to other measures of bank competition, such as HHI, RSIndex and Branch Den-
sity, and to an interaction approach. Results are not reported by available on request from the authors.
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4.3  Banking market competition and information specialization of corporate 
innovation
Our earlier evidence, along with existing literature, consistently shows a favorable effect 
of improved banking market competition on corporate innovation in terms of both quan-
tity and quality of innovation. However, how banks allocate additional credit supply with 
increased market competition is less understood. Corporate innovation activities carry a 
nature of being both risky (Amit et al. 1990) and informationally opaque (Hall et al. 2005) 
Table 2  Banking marking competition and corporate innovation—a revisit
In a set of tests, we use different bank competition measures and model specifications (first column) to 
regress the quantity (Patents) and quality (Citations) of corporate innovation by controlling for the same set 
of control variables and fixed effects as specified in baseline model Eq. (1). We only report the estimate of 
the key variables and all other results are available from the authors on request. Standard errors are clus-
tered at lender-firm year level and reported in parentheses. We run F tests and Durbin and Wu-Hausman 
tests in all 2SLS models and our results, not reported but available on request, supports the existence of 
bank competition endogeneity and the validates our IV approach. ***, **, and * denotes statistical signifi-
cant level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively
Models Bank market concentration measures and model 
specification
Number of 
observa-
tions
Ln(Patents)it Ln(Citations)it
1 and 2 Hjt (OLS model) 35,966 0.006 0.144***
(0.031) (0.046)
3 and 4 Hjt (2SLS model) 34,465 1.471*** 4.234***
(0.217) (0.367)
5 and 6 Hjt (Poisson model) 35,966 0.024 0.094***
(0.032) (0.198)
7 and 8 Hjt (IV-Poisson model) 35,937 2.03*** 2.696***
(0.250) (0.329)
9 and 10 Hjt (2SLS model with samples since 1997) 27,047 1.19*** 3.059***
(0.224) (0.329)
11 and 12 Hjt (2SLS model with samples nascent firms) 23,055 1.422*** 4.543***
(0.290) (0.497)
13 and 14 Hjt (2SLS model with samples available in all 
years)
15,111 1.354*** 4.807***
(0.427) (0.700)
15 and 16 Hjt (2SLS model with samples excluding the tech 
bubble period 1995 – 2000)
22,950 2.294*** 5.090***
(0.492) (0.724)
17 and 18 RSIndexjt (OLS model) 22,912 − 0.226*** − 0.497***
(0.006) (0.011)
19 and 20 Branch Densityjt (OLS model) 36,131 0.051*** 0.186***
(0.018) (0.027)
21 and 22 Branch Densityjt (2SLS model) 34,630 0.787*** 2.264***
(0.116) (0.197)
23 and 24 HHIjt (OLS model) 33,030 − 0.463* − 0.621*
(0.246) (0.357)
25 and 26 HHIjt (2SLS model) 33,030 − 12.137*** − 34.361***
(1.955) (3.544)
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Table 3  Banking market competition and industry information asymmetries 
The table presents regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). Models employed are 2SLS. 
All estimations include year and industry fixed effects. We run F tests and Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests in 
all 2SLS models and our results, not reported but available on request, supports the existence of bank com-
petition endogeneity and the validates our IV approach. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 
and 1% level respectively
Dependent variable  ln(Patent)it ln(Citation)it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Opaque Transparent Opaque Transparent
Hjt 2.448*** 1.025*** 5.653*** 3.114***
(0.592) (0.191) (0.868) (0.349)
Size 0.269*** 0.257*** 0.215*** 0.329***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018)
Age − 0.176*** − 0.192*** − 0.231*** − 0.315***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.049) (0.043)
ROA − 0.206*** − 0.180*** − 0.143*** − 0.184***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.041)
Cash holding 0.195*** 0.231*** 0.328*** 0.526***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.078) (0.097)
Asset tangibility − 0.570*** − 0.651*** − 0.315*** − 0.877***
(0.078) (0.072) (0.117) (0.130)
Capital to labour ratio 0.153*** 0.227*** 0.092*** 0.278***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024)
Bank loan ratio − 0.055*** − 0.057*** − 0.063** − 0.020
(0.020) (0.019) (0.029) (0.033)
Leverage 0.001** 0.001 0.002 − 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln(Sales) 0.011 0.027*** 0.006 0.018
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.017)
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.017*** 0.002 0.025***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Product market HHI − 0.845* − 1.652 3.117*** 1.848
(0.490) (1.076) (0.755) (1.816)
Product market  HHI2 0.555 2.008 − 1.388** 0.254
(0.356) (1.608) (0.562) (2.726)
Coincident Index 0.003 − 0.001 0.008* − 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Venture capital 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,076 17,221 17,076 17,221
Chi2 test of coefficient difference p < 0.01 p < 0.01
R-squared 0.240 0.286 0.139 0.184
F-statistic 25.442*** 71.499*** 23.303*** 66.526***
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and more concentrated patenting activities are characterized by a higher degree of propri-
etary information specialization. With a greater market competition, banks face a trade-off 
between risk diversification by allocating additional credit supply to firms with more diver-
sified innovation activities, and the benefit of economies of scale in specialized information 
acquisition by financing a specific range of innovation, such as biomedical sector only.
To test the moderating role of information specialization which is measured as the kur-
tosis of patent type distribution, we employ various analysis (interaction vs. grouping) and 
sampling approaches (all and restricted samples by excluding observations with 1 patent 
only) and report results in Table 4. Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 show that the favorable effects 
from banking market competition (H) are weaker for firms with dispersed patent types 
(Dispersed patent =1) than for those with concentrated patent types (Dispersed patent =0), 
being also reflected by the negative coefficients of the interaction terms. This result is also 
robust to grouping approach (Models 3–5) and the use of an alternative measure (variance) 
of patent types distribution (Model 6), supporting our conjecture that with improved market 
Table 4  Banking market competition and patent types distribution
The table presents regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). Models employed are 2SLS. 
In Models 1–5, we define the firms with higher kurtosis of the empirical distribution of patents among 
6 different categories than 3 in year t to be ‘concentrated’ ( Patent distributionit = 0 ). To address the con-
cern that extreme case may bias the identification, we remove the sample firms which only has one patent 
granted in year t from the estimation and the results are reported in Models 2 and 4. In Model 6, we define 
the firms having concentrated patents ( Patent distributionit = 0) if its variance of patent types distribution is 
greater than the across-industry median value and dispersed patents otherwise. All estimations include year 
and industry fixed effects. We run F tests and Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests in all 2SLS models and our 
results, not reported but available on request, supports the existence of bank competition endogeneity and 
the validates our IV approach. The results for firm control variables are not reported but available from the 
authors on request. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% level respectively
Dependent variable: 
ln (Patent)it
Interaction Concentrated Dispersed Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All sample Restricted All sample Restricted All sample All sample
Hjt 2.102*** 2.621*** 2.189*** 2.065*** 1.762*** 0.744**
(0.404) (0.473) (0.703) (0.430) (0.356) (0.316)
Hjt × Patent distributionit. − 1.388*** − 1.765*** − 0.692***
(0.303) (0.347) (0.220)
Patent distributionit 0.945*** 1.173*** 1.372***
(0.175) (0.201) (0.127)
Firm- and state-level 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,606 13,470 10,418 8259 6188 28,953
R-squared 0.491 0.495 0.498 0.493 0.495 0.5485
F-statistic 157.70*** 188.78*** 103.13*** 113.13*** 155.95*** 112.61***
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competition, banks would channel their funds to finance more concentrated types of innova-
tion because of the economies of scale in collecting more specialized information.8
4.4  Banking market competition and innovative efficiencies
As a synthetic investment-driven process, innovation activities may show different efficien-
cies over R&D investment (e.g. Harhoff et al. 1999) and the effects of bank competition 
on innovation efficiencies are, however, less understood. In this section, we fill in this gap 
and examine the effects of bank competition, measured by H, on innovation inputs (R&D 
expenditure), innovation efficiencies in terms of the number of patents generated by per 
million dollar R&D investment and the return on R&D investment.9 Table 5 shows that 
improved banking market competition increases credit supply to innovative businesses in 
R&D expenditure (Model 1). For example, an increase of banking market competition (H) 
by 0.1 leads to an increase of annual R&D investment by $89.52 m averagely for each firm. 
Table 5  The effects of banking market competition on corporate innovation efficiency
The table presents regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). Models employed are 2SLS. 
We run F tests and Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests in all 2SLS models and our results, not reported but 
available on request, supports the existence of bank competition endogeneity and the validates our IV 
approach. All estimations include year and industry fixed effects. The results for firm control variables are 
not reported but available from the authors on request. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 
and 1% level respectively
Dependent variable ln(R&D)it+1 ln(Patent∕R&D)it ln(Profit∕R&D)it
(1) (2) (3)
Hjt 0.681*** 0.245*** 2.196***
(0.229) (0.084) (0.284)
Firm- and state-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,323 34,465 34,087
R-squared 0.629 0.111 0.295
F-statistic 223.09*** 18.14*** 62.27***
8 Another possible reason is that firms with more concentrated patenting activities rely more heavily on 
external finance. We test the correlation between patent distribution and dependence on external finance 
(capital expenditures—cash flow from operations)/capital expenditures) and find the correlation is economi-
cally weak (ρ = 0.0373; p < 0.01). In addition, concerning that firms holding the large part of a market spe-
cific patent would practice a monopoly price on the patent and be more profitable, we re-test bank com-
petition effects on corporate innovative efficiency by focusing on the ‘dominant’ firms (firms with higher 
‘Sales/Total sales’ ratio than the industry median and the five largest sample firms at the three-digit SIC 
code level) only, which perform relatively more research and the persistence of monopoly. We find that 
competition in state banking industry would also exert a beneficial effect on innovative activities of firms 
which can practice a monopoly price on the patents due to the large part of market specific expertise of the 
project vocation. Results are not reported by available on request from the authors. We appreciate an anony-
mous referee for raising this valuable point.
9 This research focuses on the productions of U.S. companies only and the main proposition of estimations 
is that possessing a patent would be the result of successful previous R&D, which therefore signals the 
general R&D competencies of a firm. Upon the availability of data, future research could explore further on 
the understanding of the synergy effect on firms’ R&D portfolio. We appreciate an anonymous referee for 
raising this insightful point.
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In addition, banking market competition improves innovation efficiencies in terms of the 
number of patents generated by per million dollar R&D investment (Model 2) and return 
on R&D investment (Model 3). On one hand, firms that are at a more advanced stage in 
their development would be better placed to innovate, and on the other hand, the increased 
innovation stemming from the developed banking market would foster creative destruc-
tion since output reallocation towards the more successful and efficient firms. This novel 
evidence on the effects of bank competition on innovation efficiencies suggests that with 
improved bank market competition, the increased credit supply has been channeled to the 
most productive innovation activities. To investigate a longer term effect of improved bank 
competition on innovation efficiency, we also use three year averaged R&D, patent num-
bers and profit, over t + 1 and t + 3, and our results, not reported but available on request 
from the authors, still hold.
To delve deeper into the extent to which banking market competition drives the effi-
ciency of innovative projects, we follow the literature (e.g. Butler and Cornaggia 2011) 
and investigate two possible mechanisms, the credit supply and pricing mechanism respec-
tively, through which the banking competition promotes corporate innovation. Our key 
conjecture is that if banking competition directly improves the access to credit, reduces the 
cost of capital and hence alleviates financial constraints of innovative firms.
We start by comparing different marginal effects of banking competition on innovation 
based on firms’ reliance on external capital. Following Duchin et al. (2010), we consider 
a firm’s dependence on external finance as its capital expenditures minus cash flow from 
operations divided by capital expenditures and define a dummy variable, Dependenceit , 
which is coded as one for corporation-years below the industry median external finance 
dependence value (i.e., less external financial dependence) and zero otherwise. By interact-
ing Dependenceit with bank competition H, Models 1–3 in Table 6 show consistent evi-
dence on the positive of banking market competition on corporate innovation. In particular, 
the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term (Model 1) suggests that the 
beneficial effect of banking market competition is more prevalent among firms with greater 
dependence on external finance. It is expected that increasing competition among banks 
would provide easier access to credit for firms. The results are also confirmed by grouping 
samples according to the proxy of external financial dependence (Models 2 and 3). We take 
this as a ‘credit supply’ mechanism where with increased bank competition, credit supply 
increases.
Furthermore, we regress interest expenses/total debt of innovative firms on H in order to 
ascertain the effects of banking market competition on firms’ lending rates, given the lim-
ited data matching corporate lending relationships. According to Models 4–9 (Table 6), the 
improved banking market competition would reduce the costs of finance for sample firms, 
and such effect is only statistically significant for more innovative firms (Models 5) and 
firms producing more concentrated patents (Models 8). We take this as a ‘pricing’ mecha-
nism. Overall, our evidence suggests that increasing competition among banks would pro-
vide easier access to credit for firms, and the cheaper external finance frequently promotes 
entrepreneurial incentives toward undertaking excessively risky projects.
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4.5  Robustness tests
Table 2 has shown that our findings on the overall favorable effects of bank competition on 
corporate innovation are robust to various alternative bank competition measures (HHI, RSIn-
dex, Branch Density), model specifications (OLS, SLS, Poisson, IV-Poisson) and sampling 
approaches. Notably that the substantial increase of alternative financing sources for R&D 
activities during the second half of the 1990s may potentially bias the estimates of banking 
financing (Brown et al. 2009), in particular, we re-test the specifications by restricting the obser-
vations excluding (1) the tech stock bubble period 1995–2000 (Models 15 and 16 in Table 2) 
and (2) the observations from California and New York which experienced a dramatic increase 
in both innovation activities and alternative financing sources during the period considered.10
Adding value to existing literature by focusing on the information issue at both industry 
and firm level on corporate innovation and innovation efficiencies, we run a rich set of tests 
on the robustness of our early results. First, following Table 2, we use various alternative 
bank competition measures and our results still hold where firms with more opaque infor-
mation at both industry and innovation level would benefit more from improved bank com-
petition (Table 7). For example, Table 7 shows that the estimates of HHI are all negative 
and statistically significant. To gauge the economic significance, one standard deviation 
increase of HHI would result in 51% decrease in patent counts for informationally opaque 
firms (Model 5) and 23% for those informationally transparent samples (Model 6).
The beneficial effects of the improved banking competition on innovative efficiencies 
also closely mirror those of our earlier findings (Table 8). By assuming an exogenous bank-
ing market deregulation, the OLS result in Model 1 (Table 8) shows that firms in the states 
with the most restrictions on interstate branching would have 83% less R&D expenditure 
than firms in the states that completely open to interstate branching. Second, we use an 
alternative instrument (bank tangible capital ratio) to control for the endogeneity of bank 
market competition and all our above results hold.11 Finally, we use alternative sampling 
approaches12 and Tables 9 and 10 show that the findings are not driven by those nascent 
innovative firms and they are not affected by the time trend if addressing the policies con-
cern that potentially affecting innovation. Given an example, the results reported in Models 
1 and 2 in Table 9 consistently show the negative and statistically significant estimates for 
the interaction terms. Empirically, around 10% more successful patents generated from the 
firms with more concentrated patents between 1997 and 2010 and such gap is identified up 
to 27% in citation outputs. In contrast, an increase of H by 0.1 would only increase 5% in 
patent counts and 10% in citations for firms which produce more dispersed patents.
10 Results are not reported by available on request from the authors. We thank an anonymous referee for 
raising this point.
11 Results are not reported by available from the authors on request.
12 To justify that, in the presence of alternative financing sources, that the favorable effects of bank com-
petition on corporate innovation would long hold for both R&D-intensive firms and others, we re-test our 
baseline specifications by grouping sample firms according to the industrial R&D intensity, where R&D 
intensity was calculated as the ratio of total R&D expenditures to sales at a three-digit SIC industry-level. 
We find that our baseline results are robust and by comparison, the economic magnitude of the positive 
effect of banking market competition is greater among firms operating in high R&D intensity industries. It 
additionally supports our findings that the increased local bank competition would drive the efficiency of 
innovative projects. Results are not reported by available on request from the authors. We thank an anony-
mous referee for raising this point.
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5  Conclusions
Since the implementation of IBBEA in 1990s, U.S. banking market has become more com-
petitive. Differing from literature on the financial aspects of banks and firms (e.g. Rice and 
Strahan 2010), this paper investigates the impacts of state-level banking market competition 
on firm level corporate innovation. Our results reinforce the favorable effects of the improved 
local banking market competition on corporate innovation. We show bank competition 
increases innovation outputs, such as patents and citations and inputs, such as R&D expendi-
tures. Our results also show that bank competition improves innovation efficiencies in terms 
of outputs per $m R&D investment and enables informationally more opaque innovative firms 
to be less financially constrained and to benefit more from the increased credit supply. Our 
empirical evidence strongly supports market power hypothesis where with improved banking 
competition, firms would have better access to bank finance with lower costs to support their 
innovation activities.
What is less understood in literature is how banks deal with asymmetric information issues 
in financing innovation activities, with improved market competition. We propose that there 
could be two strategies for banks to allocate additional credit supply in more competitive mar-
kets, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Banks could diversify risk by investing a 
Table 9  Robustness tests—alternative sampling
The table presents regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for robustness tests of the 
alternative subsamples. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of pat-
ent ( ln(Patent)it ). Models 1 and 2 consider subsample of 1997–2010. Models 3 and 4 restrict the analysis 
to firms that are present in the sample since the first year of the sample, i.e. 1992. Models 5 and 6 estimate 
sample firms that remain fully from 1992 to 2010. Models employed are 2SLS. We run F tests and Durbin 
and Wu-Hausman tests in all 2SLS models and our results, not reported but available on request, supports 
the existence of bank competition endogeneity and the validates our IV approach. All estimations include 
year and industry fixed effects, and full set of control variables. The results for firm control variables are not 
reported but available from the authors on request. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 
1% level respectively
Year > 1997 Nascent firms Firms in all observed 
years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7)
Patent Citation Patent Citation Patent Citation
Hjt 0.949*** 2.779*** 2.728*** 5.201*** 2.913*** 5.247***
(0.287) (0.507) (0.576) (0.838) (0.706) (1.003)
Hjt × Patent distributionit − 0.458** − 1.904*** − 1.880*** − 3.803*** − 2.035*** − 3.857***
(0.197) (0.362) (0.431) (0.625) (0.527) (0.746)
Patent distributionit 0.716*** 1.499*** 1.227*** 2.618*** 1.276*** 2.613***
(0.130) (0.213) (0.246) (0.357) (0.299) (0.423)
Firm- and state-level 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8116 11,945 11,472 11,472 7693 7693
R-squared 0.4130 0.629 0.511 0.517 0.558 0.607
F-statistic 117.87*** 380.49*** 146.84*** 237.80*** 147.76*** 124.88***
Bank competition, information specialization and innovation 
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
10
  
Ro
bu
stn
es
s t
es
ts–
alt
er
na
tiv
e s
am
pl
in
g (
co
ns
.)
Th
e t
ab
le 
pr
es
en
ts 
re
gr
es
sio
n 
co
effi
cie
nt
s a
nd
 st
an
da
rd
 er
ro
rs 
(in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
) f
or
 ro
bu
stn
es
s t
es
ts 
of
 th
e a
lte
rn
ati
ve
 su
bs
am
pl
es
. T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
iab
les
 ar
e t
he
 m
ea
su
re
s o
f 
in
no
va
tiv
e 
effi
cie
nc
ies
. M
od
els
 1
 a
nd
 2
 c
on
sid
er
 su
bs
am
pl
e 
of
 1
99
7–
20
10
. M
od
els
 3
 a
nd
 4
 re
str
ict
 th
e 
an
aly
sis
 to
 fi
rm
s t
ha
t a
re
 p
re
se
nt
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
sin
ce
 th
e 
fir
st 
ye
ar
 o
f 
th
e s
am
pl
e, 
i.e
. 1
99
2. 
M
od
els
 5
 an
d 
6 
es
tim
ate
 sa
m
pl
e fi
rm
s t
ha
t r
em
ain
 fu
lly
 fr
om
 1
99
2 
to
 2
01
0. 
M
od
els
 em
pl
oy
ed
 ar
e 2
SL
S.
 W
e r
un
 F
 te
sts
 an
d 
Du
rb
in
 an
d 
W
u-
Ha
us
m
an
 
tes
ts 
in
 al
l 2
SL
S 
m
od
els
 an
d 
ou
r r
es
ul
ts,
 n
ot
 re
po
rte
d 
bu
t a
va
ila
bl
e o
n 
re
qu
es
t, 
su
pp
or
ts 
th
e e
xi
ste
nc
e o
f b
an
k 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
en
do
ge
ne
ity
 an
d 
th
e v
ali
da
tes
 o
ur
 IV
 ap
pr
oa
ch
. A
ll 
es
tim
ati
on
s i
nc
lu
de
 y
ea
r a
nd
 in
du
str
y 
fix
ed
 e
ffe
cts
, a
nd
 fu
ll 
se
t o
f c
on
tro
l v
ar
iab
les
. T
he
 re
su
lts
 fo
r fi
rm
 c
on
tro
l v
ar
iab
les
 a
re
 n
ot
 re
po
rte
d 
bu
t a
va
ila
bl
e 
fro
m
 th
e 
au
th
or
s o
n 
re
qu
es
t. 
*, 
**
 an
d *
**
 de
no
te 
sta
tis
tic
al 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 at
 10
, 5
 an
d 1
% 
lev
el 
re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
Ye
ar
 >
 19
97
Na
sc
en
t fi
rm
s
Fi
rm
s i
n a
ll 
ob
se
rv
ed
 ye
ar
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
R&
D
P
a
te
n
t
R
&
D
P
ro
fi
t
R
&
D
R&
D
P
a
te
n
t
R
&
D
P
ro
fi
t
R
&
D
R&
D
P
a
te
n
t
R
&
D
P
ro
fi
t
R
&
D
H
jt
0.9
87
**
0.1
77
**
*
2.9
61
**
*
0.7
67
**
*
0.3
11
**
1.5
45
**
*
1.1
73
**
*
0.4
98
**
*
2.6
30
**
*
(0
.17
1)
(0
.09
6)
(0
.31
6)
(0
.39
0)
(0
.14
8)
(0
.47
1)
(0
.51
4)
(0
.18
6)
(0
.58
8)
Fi
rm
- a
nd
 st
ate
-le
ve
l c
on
tro
ls
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
In
du
str
y fi
xe
d e
ffe
ct
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
ar
 fi
xe
d e
ffe
ct
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ob
se
rv
ati
on
s
13
,54
6
27
,04
5
26
,67
1
23
,90
5
24
,54
7
24
,39
1
15
,90
5
15
,93
9
15
,83
6
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.7
77
2
0.1
18
0.2
66
0.6
68
0.1
12
0.3
38
0.7
08
0.1
22
0.3
95
F-
sta
tis
tic
13
38
.82
**
*
28
.82
**
*
97
.05
**
*
28
5.9
2*
**
26
.53
4*
**
21
2.0
6*
**
35
1.3
6*
**
21
.69
**
*
17
0.4
4*
**
 L. Tian et al.
1 3
wider range of innovation activities and alternatively, they could finance a certain types of 
innovation to benefit from the economies of scale in more specialized information acquisition. 
Our results show that the additional credit supply stemming from improved banking compe-
tition provides a much stronger support to those innovative firms operating in information-
ally opaque industries and firms with more specialized information (more concentrated patent 
types). Therefore, our finding reveals that banks would channel their additional credit supply 
to a certain types of innovation activities to take advantages of the economies of scale in col-
lecting more specialized information.
Our findings provide important implications. Our results suggest that improving banking 
market competition is an effective way to enhance firms’ effectiveness in generating innova-
tions because of the increased credit supply and reduced costs of finance. The greater com-
petition in local banking sector would strengthen the exclusive ties between banks and firms 
and drive banks to reallocate more resources to the borrowers which are mostly affected by 
information problems. Therefore, policy makers should target those innovative firms which 
rely more heavily on bank finance when they have difficulties to access external finance, in a 
scenario of credit supply decrease for example. Due to the unavailability of relevant data, this 
paper has not considered the impacts of non-negligible government subsidies and government 
supports to corporate innovation via taxes breaks for instance. We call for future research to 
further investigate such effects upon the availability of relevant data. In addition, we also call 
for future research on the possible over-investment with unbridled market competition.
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Appendix: Variable construction
Innovation variables
Patentit : Weight adjusted average number of patents filed by company i over years t to 
t + 2.
Citationit : Weight adjusted average number of citations received by the patents filed by 
company i over years t to t + 2.
R&Dit+1 : R&D expenditures (in $m) reported by company i in year t + 1.
Patent∕R&Dit : Number of patents generated by per $m R&D expenditures for company 
i year t.
Profit∕R&Dit : Company i’s gross profit ($m) in year t generated by per $m R&D 
expenditure in year t − 1.
Banking market competition variables
Hjt : Panzar and Rosse (1984) H-statistic of banking market competition in state j year t, 
ranging from 0 to 1. The detailed derivation is available upon request.
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RSIndexjt : Rice and Strahan (2010)’s categorical index of banking market competition 
in state j year t, ranging from 0 (deregulated) to 4 (highly regulated).
HHIjt : Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of the banking market in state j year t. We take 
weighted averages across markets for banking institutions in multiple local markets 
using the proportions of total deposits as the weights.
Densityjt : The number of branches per  km2 in state j year t.
Other control variables
Sizeit : Book value of total assets in $m of company i measured at the end of year t.
Ageit : Number of years that the company i has been in COMPUSTAT.
ROAit : EBITDA to total assets for company i in year t.
Cash holdingit : Cash and marketable securities to total assets for company i in year t.
Asset tangibilityit : Ratio of net property, plants and equipment (PPE) to total assets for 
company i in year t.
Capital to labor ratioit : Natural logarithm of the ratio between property, plants and 
equipment (PPE) and the number of employees for company i in year t.
Bank loan ratioit : Bank loan to total debt ratio of company i in year t.
Leverageit : Debt to equity ratio of company i in year t.
Salesit : Total sales in $m of company i year t.
Tobin′sQit : Ratio between market value and total assets, for company i in year t.
Product market HHIit : Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of the industry (3-digit SIC) in 
which company i operates in year t.
Coincident indexjt−1 : An index used to control for regional economic trend, which com-
bines data on nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, 
unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price 
index. More details are available from Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005).
Venture capitaljt : Ratio of total venture capital investments to total investment in state j 
year t.
Productivity growth dispersion: A measure of industry level asymmetric information, 
where productivity is defined as the ratio of sales to number of employees and disper-
sion is standard deviation of productivity growth at industry (3-digit SIC) level.
Dispersed patentsit : A dummy variable coded as 1 if company i in year t has ‘dispersed 
patent types (kurtosis < 3) and 0 otherwise.
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